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Augustine Contra Cicero:
Evaluation, Affirmation,
and the Freedom of the Will
Darren E. Dahl
Department of Religious Studies
McMaster University
[Cicero] restricts the mind of the religious man to a choice between
two alternatives: either there is something which lies within the
power of our own will, or there is foreknowledge of the future. He
considers that these statements cannot both be true, and that to affirm
one of them is to deny the other.… Thus, because he wished to make
men free, he made them ungodly. The religious mind, however,
chooses both, confesses both, and confirms both by the faith of
godliness.1

Introduction
What does it mean to be free? Given the unthought but taken for
granted assumptions of our modernity – the modernity that defines us
not only as “Westerners” but also as “Protestants” – being free seems
to mean being an independent, autonomous agent. Auto-nomos:
being free means being “our own law.” As a result of this notion of
freedom, we struggle with any suggestion that God is providentially
acting to order our histories and our lives. In point of fact, most
modern Christians seldom think in terms of God’s providence or, in
their more pious but thoughtful moments, recognize it as, at once,
spiritually satisfying and a fundamental contradiction to the
“freedom” that they take for granted in their consumer-driven
inhabitation of secular society. This conflict – between providence
and freedom – is precisely what is at stake in Augustine’s debate with
Cicero in Book 5 of The City of God. In the following argument,
therefore, I seek to situate a very current and, indeed, experienced,
perplexity within the framework of a classical theological discussion
of the will. I will show that, when Augustine’s debate with Cicero is
carefully considered in the context of his critique of Stoic and
Platonic ethics within The City of God, his approach to Cicero’s
rejection of an understanding of freedom that includes a
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corresponding account of God’s providence raises all the important
theological issues that we, modern Protestants, must address. I will
argue, in fact, that whatever one wants to say about Augustine’s ideas
concerning the free will, it is necessary first to see that his ability to
affirm freedom and providence is based on his fundamental
affirmation of God’s salvific presence in creation which, in turn,
evaluates all “reality” as a good created order.

Self-Mastery and the Problem of Free Will
In order to set Augustine’s representation of Cicero’s account of free
will in the context of his other encounters with Stoic and Platonic
ethics,2 it is necessary first to take account of Cicero’s position in
Book 5 without moving on to Augustine’s response. Cicero’s
argument proceeds as follows: the idea of God’s foreknowledge of
all future events and actions necessarily entails the claim that there
exists, in the mind of God, an already actual order of those events
and actions. Cicero’s second step develops from his first claim. If
there is an actual order of events and actions, there must also be an
actual order of causes because “nothing can come about which is not
preceded by some efficient cause” (CD, 5, 9, p. 200). Cicero then
moves to the third step of his argument: if there is a “certain order of
causes by which everything that happens happens . . . [then] all
things that happen happen by fate” (CD, 5, 9, p. 200). The result of
this argument is crucial. Because divine foreknowledge makes it
impossible to account for a human being’s power to act, it also
makes it impossible for a human being to give meaning to human
life.
For now it is enough to make a few things clear. First of all,
Cicero’s argument against divine foreknowledge is grounded on an
understanding of the will in which power and freedom are connected
in a very particular way. Secondly, the ability to give meaning to
“human life” is dependent on this connection between power and
freedom. In order to adequately make sense of these two claims I
must follow Augustine’s account and critique of Platonic and Stoic
ethics.
Augustine begins Bk. 14 by articulating the Pauline distinction
between “flesh” and “spirit.” This provides him with the occasion to
set forth his critique of the Platonic and Stoic understanding of the
relation between reason and the passions. Augustine’s argument, that
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol32/iss1/3
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all who live “according to man” and not “according to God” are
therefore living according to the flesh (CD, 14, 4, p. 586), allows him
to bring both Epicurean ethics, despised by the Stoics and the
Platonists alike for being fleshy, and Stoic and Platonic ethics under
the category of “flesh” (CD, 14, 2, p. 582). At the heart of this
strategy lies Augustine’s claim that the distinction between “flesh”
and “spirit” is not a distinction between the body and the soul and,
furthermore, not even a distinction between reason and the passions.
In order to see more clearly how this argument works, it is
worthwhile to follow Augustine’s account of the terms “flesh” and
“spirit” and the critique of Stoic and Platonic ethics that the account
produces.
In order to show that the distinction between “flesh” and “spirit”
is not premised on a rejection of the body as inherently sinful,
Augustine first turns to Paul’s own account of this distinction within
his Epistle to the Galatians. Augustine points out that the sins of the
flesh include “vices of the mind” (CD, 14, 2, p. 583). Again, with
reference to Stoic and Platonic ethics, he notes that “[i]t may be,
indeed, that a man tempers his desire for bodily pleasure out of
devotion to an idol … Even such a man as this, though he is seen to
restrain and suppress the lusts of the flesh, is still convicted, on the
authority of the apostle, of living according to the flesh; yet it is his
very abstinence from the pleasures of the flesh that demonstrates that
he is engaged in the damnable works of the flesh” (CD, 14, 2, p. 584).
The problem, therefore, is not in the body but, in fact, in the
orientation of the soul which causes the body to be corruptible,
disorderly and disobedient.3
Once we are clear that the distinction between “flesh” and
“spirit” is not intended to be between the body and the soul, we can
understand that these categories point to different postures of the
whole human being. Augustine articulates this by talking in terms of
a life lived “according to man” or “according to God.” Humans live
according to the “flesh” insofar as they are turned away from God in
a desire to make themselves the standard for truth and goodness.
While the details of this claim will occupy me later within my
account of Augustine’s theology of creation, what is important now is
Augustine’s argument that “[t]here is no need, then, in the matter of
our sins and vices, to do injustice to our Creator by accusing the
nature of flesh, which, of its own kind and in its due place, is good”
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(CD, 14, 5, p. 588). It is this very conclusion that leads Augustine
back to an explicit critique of Stoic and Platonic ethics:
For anyone who praises the nature of the soul as the highest good,
and accuses the nature of flesh as something evil, is himself fleshy
both in his devotion to the soul and his rejection of the flesh; for his
belief is a matter of human vanity, not of divine truth. The Platonists
are not, indeed, so foolish as the Manichaeans; for they do not detest
earthly bodies as the natural substance of evil.… Nonetheless, they
hold that souls are so influenced by earthly limbs and dying
members that they derive from them their unwholesome desires and
fears and joys and sorrows. And these ‘disturbances’ (as Cicero calls
them) or ‘passions’ . . . embrace all the vices of human conduct (CD,
14, 5, p. 589).

According to Augustine, the common ground covered by
Platonic and Stoic ethics is governed by a dualism between body and
soul. Basing their ethics on such a metaphysical dualism between the
body (i.e., mutable and material reality) and the soul (i.e., immutable
and immaterial reality) forces them to develop it within a subsequent
anthropological dualism between reason and the passions (or, as
Cicero calls them, “disturbances”) or else risk rendering the
connection between a human being and its reality incoherent.4 In
other words, once the Stoics and Platonists assume a dualism between
the material and the immaterial, the dualism between something like
reason and passion becomes necessary if human beings are to be
understood according to that governing metaphysical dualism.
Once this metaphysical and anthropological dualism is in place
and one term is chosen in opposition to the other, an ethics of selfmastery is inevitable.5 In order to see Augustine’s diagnosis and
critique of this ethics of self-mastery we must first back up to Bk. 9 in
order to get in on the beginning of Augustine’s direct critique of Stoic
and Platonic ethics. In the fourth chapter of Bk. 9, Augustine begins
his discussion of the Stoic and Platonic account of the relation
between virtue and the passions. He explains that while some
philosophers call the disturbances or passions by different names, they
are in agreement that the source of these disturbances is in the body
and the external world: “For the Stoics refuse to call bodily and
external things ‘goods’. Rather, they call them ‘advantages,’ because
they consider that there is no good for man except virtue, and that this
is the art of living well, which exists only in the mind. The other
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philosophers . . . call these things ‘goods’; but they hold that, in
comparison with virtue . . . they are little things and of small value”
(CD, 9, 4, p. 362). Whatever one calls them, the goods of the body and
things relating to the body (i.e., external things), are, in themselves,
fundamentally devalued within an ethics that is governed by the
dualisms described above. Such an ethics must, therefore, posit both a
relation to these non-goods (otherwise there would be no point in
including them within the dualism) and the need to master them.
Augustine develops this central feature of Platonic and Stoic
ethics further in the eighth chapter of Bk. 14. In response to the
passions of desire, joy, fear and grief, the wise man pursues the good
by “willing” it such that “gladness” arises from the good’s attainment
and “caution” guards against seeking to attain a good that cannot be
possessed, that is to say, cannot be possessed solely by the mind. As
a result of never desiring a good which cannot be attained by the
mind’s virtue, the Stoic sage will never suffer grief, that is, “an evil
which has already happened” (CD, 14, 8, p. 593). Here again we see
the same ethics of self-mastery at work. Grief must be rejected by
Stoic ethics because it most profoundly points to the passivity
inherent in the body’s affections and passions. In other words,
because grief points to the evil that “has already happened” it points
to the human being’s way of responding to the given and undergone
nature of life. Grief can only be rejected by refusing this passivity and
the worldliness that it reveals. To do that, however, is to place that
very worldliness outside the realm of what has value while, at the
same time, to admit its possibility within human existence and,
therefore, to seek to master human existence by suppressing that
devalued element.
Augustine’s criticism of such an ethics of self-mastery takes two
forms. First, he criticizes it from within by showing how the dualism
between reason and passion is impossible to sustain and is, in fact,
shown to be so with reference to Stoic ethics itself. Second, he places
Stoic ethics in contrast to Christian ethics and discloses the reactive,
fearful posture which lies at the basis of Stoic ethics. Augustine’s two
criticisms of Stoic and Platonic ethics converge insofar as his account
of the role of valuation within the first criticism lies at the heart of his
second criticism.
In Bk. 9 Augustine recounts a story from Aulus Gellius
concerning a Stoic philosopher who once shared a journey with him.
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While at sea the ship on which they traveled “was tossed about and
in great peril this philosopher grew pale with fear” (CD, 9, 4, p. 363).
When, after the storm had passed, the philosopher was asked about
his response to the storm, he gave Aulus Gellius a book of Stoic
philosophy in which Gellius read
that the soul experiences certain mental images … and that it is not
in our power to determine whether and when these shall strike the
soul. When these images come about as a result of terrifying and
awesome things, they of necessity move the soul even of the wise
man … This does not, however, cause the mind to fear any evil, nor
to approve of these images nor consent to them. For such consent,
they hold, is within our power … [T]he wise man, though he
experiences them of necessity, nonetheless retains with mind
unshaken a true and steadfast perception of those things which he
ought rationally to seek or avoid (CD, 9, 4, pp. 363-364).

Augustine explains that, according to the Stoics and Platonists,
“the mind and reason of the wise man are not under the dominion of
the passions” (CD, 9, 4, p. 364). By their own account, then, the
relation described above, between reason, the mind and the soul as
related to the passions, the body and the external world but
nevertheless master over them, is preserved and perfectly exhibited
by this traveling philosopher. However, Augustine challenges this
view precisely with reference to the experience of the storm-tossed
philosopher. He argues: “For if the philosopher attached no value to
the things which he thought himself about to lose in a shipwreck –
that is, his life or his bodily wellbeing – then surely he would not
have been so terrified by the peril as to betray his fear by the
testimony of his pallor” (CD, 9, 4, p. 364, italics added). Augustine’s
argument, offered on the basis of the Stoic philosopher’s own
experience, is that by valuing certain things (i.e., life and well-being)
over certain other things (i.e., death or bodily suffering), one has
already incorporated one’s reason and one’s passion. Valuation, then,
is nothing other than a judgment of reason made on the basis of what
one ultimately desires and this passionate relation is no more clearly
shown then when one is faced with the loss of the desirable object.
The dualism between reason and the passions needed by an ethics of
self-mastery is, therefore, a fiction. In his discussion of Augustine’s
Stoic sage, James Wetzel, in his Augustine and the Limits of Virtue,
nicely makes this point: “The image of reason as deflecting passion
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or emotion in the manner of a fortress wall deflecting an outside
enemy no longer captures the quality of the assault. For if Augustine
is right to suggest that disruptive passion reveals what the sage
values, at least insofar as passion is itself an expression of some
judgment of value, then reason is implicated in the experience and the
enemy is within the gates.”6 According to Augustine’s account, Stoic
ethics is based on a phenomenological misrepresentation of what they
actually hold to be the case. Like the “fools” with whom they contrast
themselves, the Stoics and Platonists live a passion-driven life in
which judgments of value are constantly employed yet never
recognized. At this level, then, Augustine has shown that the basis of
the Stoic and Platonic ethics of self-mastery is phenomenologically
impossible to sustain and, therefore, another phenomenology of the
self is necessary.
In keeping with the dispositional approach articulated in terms of
the Pauline categories of “flesh” and “spirit,” Augustine offers an
alternative account of the passions and their relation to virtue. On this
basis he begins his most profound critique of Stoic ethics. He refuses
to endorse an anthropological dualism by understanding human
action in terms of its orientation towards or away from the good
rather than dividing that agency along the lines of a body-soul split.
In Bk. 14 he explains that what is important is the “quality” of the
will (CD, 14, 6, p. 590). This quality of the will is determined by that
toward which the soul is oriented and, therefore, the passions or
emotions that arise as the result of this orientation will be judged on
the basis of the orientation (CD, 14, 6, p. 590). Thus, contrary to the
Stoics and the Platonists, the passions are not the problem. Rather, the
passions and emotions are disclosive of a will that is turned toward or
away from the good. More will be said about Augustine’s account of
the will when I turn to an examination of his theology of creation. For
now, what is most important about his alternative discussion of the
passions is that our passions or, perhaps better, our passion-inspired
existence, is disclosive of what we affirm and, indeed, whether we are
actually able to live in terms of affirmation. This concern with
affirmation can be detected in his account of fear and love in the ninth
chapter of Bk. 14.
Before turning to Augustine’s treatment of fear and love I want to
present the groundwork for my reading of that treatment. I want to
suggest that it is in the midst of that treatment that Augustine most
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2007
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significantly indicts Stoic ethics as an ethics of fear and reactivity.
Central to this reactivity and fear is the issue of valuation. As we have
seen, Augustine’s first criticism of Stoic and Platonic ethics revealed
the place of valuation within their thought. Now, in this second
critique, Augustine will call into question the basis of these
valuations. Following Gilles Deleuze’s account of Nietzsche, we
might say that Augustine is carrying out a critique of Stoicism and
Platonism that is at once his own “evaluation”: “The problem of
critique is that of the value of values, of the evaluation from which
their value arises, thus the problem of their creation … Evaluations,
in essence, are not values but ways of being, modes of existence of
those who judge and evaluate, serving as principles for the values on
the basis of which they judge.”7 In other words, one’s evaluation of
reality is the claim to truth implied in one’s whole way of being in the
world. Because all existence is passionately inspired, each particular
“form” of existence (i.e., each evaluation) will emerge on the basis of
what is ultimately valued. What gives each particular form of
passionate existence its particularity (i.e., its claim to truth) is the fact
it always implies interpretation and, therefore, always brings with it
a certain way of “constructing” the world. Remaining within a
Nietzschian terminology, one can say that evaluation happens either
from the within the space of an ‘affirmation’ or a failure to affirm.8
To fail to affirm is to be reactive. In his treatment of the relation
between fear and love, Augustine suggests that Stoic ethics is based
on an evaluation in which a fundamental fear of its other, i.e., the
body and the external world, is primary. Therefore it is already a
reactive response to its other and not, as it claims to be, an
independent affirmation of the life of the soul.
Augustine begins his treatment by pointing out the way in which
the Scriptures distinguish between two types of fear: “Now one kind
of fear is that of which the apostle John speaks: ‘There is no fear in
love; but perfect love casteth out fear: because fear hath torment. He
that feareth is not made perfect in love.’ This, however is not fear of
the same kind as that felt by the apostle Paul when he feared lest the
Corinthians be beguiled by the subtlety of the serpent. This latter is
the fear which love has, and which, indeed, only love has” (CD, 14,
9, pp. 600-601). In reflecting on this distinction it is important to keep
in mind that one sort of fear is proper to love and this is contrasted to
a fear that brings torment. The latter kind of fear, that which is
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol32/iss1/3
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entangled with torment, is a fear “that frightens a man away from an
evil which may befall him” and is generated by “the anxiety of an
infirmity which fears to sin” (CD, 14, 9, p. 601). Love’s fear, on the
other hand, “is clean, enduring for ever” and, as such, is a fear “which
keeps [one] steadfast in a good which cannot be lost” (CD, 14, 9, p.
601). Such a fear, Augustine continues, “that is ‘clean’ signifies the
act of will by which we shall invariably refuse to sin … not with the
anxiety of an infirmity which fears to sin, but the with the tranquility
of love” (CD, 14, 9, p. 601, italics added).
Ideas such as “tranquility,” the protection against “an evil which
may befall” man, and the attainment of that which cannot be lost, are
clear indicators that Augustine has Stoic and Platonic ethics in mind
in the midst of this important discussion of fear and love. At the heart
of the distinction lies a description of what could only be Augustine’s
account of the ground of Stoic and Platonic ethics: a refusal of the
passions and the external world based on a reactive posture that is
grounded on a “fear which frightens man away from an evil which
may befall him” and is, therefore, entangled in the torment of anxiety.
Unlike the Christian, who is connected to the true source of love
which cannot be lost because it is eternal, the Stoic is left in an
antagonistic relationship to the world that must be rejected but, in this
very rejection, forms the basis of the Stoic’s negative posture. In
contrast to this, Christian love is grounded on a fundamental
affirmation that the source of its tranquility and steadfastness is the
eternal source of the world. Therefore, the world and the passions of
the body do not, for the Christian, become the enemy but, rather, the
very place in which, and the very means by which, such tranquility
and steadfastness take shape. Ironically, the Stoic ethics of apatheia
is the least able to engage in an affirmation that maintains a
productive distance from the world because at every step its selfenclosure and pretended distance from the world is but a fearful
reaction to the world’s impending ‘disturbance’. Augustine’s sense of
affirmation, on the other hand, does provide the critical distance from
the world that is necessary to embrace the world for what it is: the gift
of the good God (CD, 11, 23, p. 478). Such a distance-producing
affirmation involves understanding the body and the passions within
the gifted order of creation which means recognizing both their
goodness (again, consider the example of the apostle Paul) and their
danger.
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The conclusion that can now be offered is crucial: the Stoic and
Platonic ethics of self-mastery is thoroughly reactive because it is
grounded on a fundamentally antagonistic assessment of the
“worldly” which results from the assumption of a body-soul dualism
which is already an evaluation of the world. In other words,
Augustine’s rejection of Stoic and Platonic ethics is not the rejection
of an “argument” that could have just as easily been ignored. Rather,
it is the rejection of one way of being in the world on the basis of a
critical confrontation with another way of being in the world. At the
heart of this contestation lies the meaning of freedom. Within the
terms set by the Stoic and Platonic evaluation, freedom from
disturbance emerges as the ultimate goal. The possibility of this
freedom is understood to lie within the human being’s power remove
himself from the ‘world’ by mastering the negative elements that
inhibit his freedom.9 It is precisely these conclusions, I will now
argue, that one must keep in mind as one considers Cicero’s defense
of free will against divine foreknowledge.
When, at the beginning of this investigation, I considered
Cicero’s arguments, I pointed out the connection between power and
freedom and the fact that such a connection was crucial to
understanding the meaning of human life. Now that I have developed
Augustine’s assessment and critique of Stoic and Platonic ethics, it
will be easier to show that Cicero’s own pre-understanding is deeply
shaped by Stoic and Platonic assumptions. Cicero assumes that the
connection between freedom and power is defined in a particular
way. First, he assumes that the will’s power is the power to shape
one’s life by initiating a causality that is one’s own. Freedom,
therefore, is the power to initiate one’s own causality without
resistance. Necessary to this understanding of freedom is the negative
assumption that if one speaks of an order of causes in any way known
in advance within the divine mind, such an order is necessarily at
odds with the power of human agency because such an order denies
power its freedom to initiate its own causality. If I am right in
pointing to the antagonistic posture of Stoic and Platonic ethics, it is
clear that this assumed antagonism grounds Cicero’s claim that an
actualized order of causes, however one might understand that, must
be understood as fundamentally opposed to free human agency. One
may, at this point, object: but how could such an order of causes not
oppose human freedom given that human freedom is exactly the
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freedom to govern one’s actions independently of all external causes.
Such an objection, however, reinforces the dependence on Stoic and
Platonic ethics and opens onto the second point of agreement
between Cicero and Stoic ethics. If the human being necessarily
exists in opposition to the external world, then freedom must mean
freedom from the forces of that external world, the greatest of which,
for both Cicero and the Stoics, is fate. However, such an
understanding of freedom is fundamentally dependent on a
particularly Stoic and Platonic evaluation. If, within the terms set by
a different evaluation, the human being is not understood to be in
fundamental opposition to the world, then human freedom can and
will mean something entirely different than freedom from the world.
Furthermore, having to be able to give meaning to one’s own human
life by exercising such freedom and power – Cicero’s second concern
– continues to reinforce the opposition between the human agent and
the “world” and is itself fundamentally dependent upon a certain
evaluation of reality. One might suggest that Augustine’s Cicero was
the best representative of this Stoic and Platonic evaluation in that he
truly understood and embraced the dualism between body and soul
and the ethics of self-mastery that it proposes. As its best proponent,
he had to save it from a contradiction (i.e., the positing of both free
will and divine foreknowledge within a oppositional and dualistic
anthropology and metaphysics) and, therefore, he sought to disprove
that which could not be the case (i.e., divine foreknowledge) in favor
that which was most certain of all (i.e., self-mastery through freedom
and power).

Augustine’s Theology of Creation: The Will Revisited
In the following section I will not be attempting to give an exhaustive
account of Augustine’s theology of creation or his understanding of
the will. My goal is to raise some important points from within his
theology of creation in The City of God (mostly from Bk. 11) in order
to revisit his response to Cicero. Even within Augustine’s response to
Cicero I will only take up those points that allow me bring to light the
important connection between Augustine’s affirmative evaluation of
reality and his confession of free will and divine foreknowledge.
I will begin my account of Augustine’s affirmative evaluation of
reality where Augustine’s own theology of creation intersects most
clearly with his treatment of Stoicism. Central to Augustine’s
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understanding of true judgment is his understanding of the creature’s
participation in God’s ordering which, as he will point out, is a
participation in God. Based on a reading of the opening chapters of
Genesis, Augustine argues that creaturely self-knowledge is
illuminated when it is directed toward “the praise and love of the
creator” (CD, 11, 7, p. 457).
The important claim here is that knowledge of the world and the
self shares in truth only insofar as that knowledge is placed in the
“light” of God’s wisdom which is, for Augustine, “the art by which
[creaturely things] were made” (CD, 11, 7, p. 458). In order to
elaborate on this, it is necessary to take note of the trinitarian order
that he discovers within creation itself. Augustine claims that “there
is no nature, even among the least and the lowest of the beasts, which
was not wrought by Him from Whom comes all the measure, all the
form and all the order without which nothing can be found or
conceived to exist” (CD, 11, 15, pp. 469-470). These categories of
measure, form and order will become the focus for his trinitarian
account of creation in the twenty-second chapter of Bk. 11, where he
argues that the very logic of Scripture’s account of creation contains
within itself the threefold structure of the Trinity:
[I]f the intention of Scripture had been only to tell us Who made the
light, it would have been enough to say, ‘God made the light.’ And if
it had wished us to know not only Who made the light, but by what
means it had been made, it would have been enough to announce,
‘And God said, Let there be light, and there was light,’ that we might
know not only that God made the light, but that He made it by His
Word. But because it was fitting that three great truths regarding
creation should be intimated to us – that is, Who made it, by what
means, and why – Scripture says: ‘God said, Let there be light, and
there was light. And God saw the light that it was good’” (CD, 11,
22, pp. 475-476).

Scripture’s witness to creation takes this threefold structure
because in its fullness it discloses to us the source, means and reason
for creation’s existence. Given what was claimed before about truly
knowing a thing when one knows the art by which it was made, we
can now see that truly to know creation, and ourselves as a part of that
creation, is to know the source, means and reason of the created order.
But, Augustine clearly points out, to know that is to know God. This
last claim is always twofold: truly to know the created order is to
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol32/iss1/3
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know that it comes from God through God’s Word by the delight of
God’s Spirit and, secondly, to know that in knowing that one knows
God. In other words, we truly know the created order only insofar as
we know it as God’s creation and we know God through that created
order insofar as the threefold structure of creation’s createdness gives
us a “profound and mystic intimation of the Trinity: that is, of the
Father [measure/source], Son [Word/means], and Holy Spirit
[goodness/reason why]” (CD 11, 23, p. 480).10
As “natural” as this account may sound, Augustine is clear that
such truthful knowledge of God and the created order is by no means
automatically achieved. The reason for this is simply that in order to
know the created order in this way one’s will must be directed toward
“the praise and love of the creator” (CD, 11, 7, p. 457). In other
words, right knowledge is fundamentally implicated in right desire.
Augustine’s Pauline alternative to the Platonic and Stoic dualism of
body and soul is grounded in his orientational approach and it is for
this reason that everyone who is not ‘directed toward’ God is, by
definition, directed toward the “flesh,” that is to say, directed toward
some other source of truth. From this claim two things follow that
have a direct bearing on Augustine’s discussion with Cicero and Stoic
and Platonic ethics. First, Augustine’s theology of creation
establishes the possibility for an affirmation of the created order that
maintains enough distance from it so as to see it as a created order
that witnesses to its Creator. Second, any understanding of the
creature’s relation to the world which posits an opposition between
the order of causes of the external world and the creature herself is
nothing but an enactment of what Augustine will show to be the root
of all sin: the prideful refusal to see oneself as a harmonious part of
the whole. It is to this prideful refusal that we must now briefly turn.
Insofar as the Stoic ethos is grounded on a claim which posits an
opposition between the order of causes (i.e., fate) and the free human
agent, it is a textbook case for Augustine’s understanding of sin. In
his introduction to Bk. 12, Augustine formulates his account of the
sin of pride by noting that “some [of the angels] remained constant
in cleaving to that which was the common good of them all: that is,
to God Himself, and His eternity, truth and love. Others, however,
delighting in their own power, and supposing that they could be their
own good, fell from that higher and blessed good which was
common to them all and embraced a private good of their own” (CD,
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12, 1, p. 498). Just like the angels, human beings, though naturally
good and intended to be oriented to God, turn away from God by
valuing themselves as their own source of power, goodness and
truth. This turn toward oneself is a refusal to accept one’s place
within the order and measure of creation (i.e., a refusal to look
through the created order to its true source) and, therefore, a refusal
of the created order qua common.11 Such a refusal of both the
common created order and its true source is disclosed by the
subsequent antagonistic construction of that order in terms of private
power and opposition.12 That this turn is a turn from one source of
power in order to seek power in oneself is crucial for Augustine’s
engagement with Cicero.
Earlier I pointed out that Cicero’s objection to divine
foreknowledge was premised on an understanding of human power as
the power to initiate one’s own causality and therefore to prevail
against external causes in the world. This power is fundamentally
connected to freedom which is the freedom from these external
causes, that is to say, the freedom of self-determination. Given
Augustine’s critique of Stoic ethics and his alternative theology of
creation, it will come as no surprise that this sort of oppositional
construction of the relation between human agency and creation’s
causality is exactly what Augustine rejects in Cicero’s position.
Augustine is able to affirm what Cicero cannot because Augustine
understands the relation between human agency and the created
cosmos very differently. This difference can be developed along two
lines, both of which point to the fundamental issue of power and
freedom. First, Augustine does not establish an opposition between
creature and cosmos because the cosmos is always already affirmed
as the created order, that is to say, the good work of a personal creator.
This is the point of Augustine’s playful transformation of Cicero’s
notion of “fate”:
Moreover, as to an order of causes in relation to which the will of
God can do all things: we do not deny this, but neither do we bestow
upon it the name of fate, unless perhaps, we may understand ‘fate’ to
be derived from ‘fari,’ ‘to speak’. For we cannot deny that it is
written in the sacred Scriptures: ‘God hath spoken once; these two
things have I heard, that power belongeth unto God. Also unto Thee,
O God, belongth mercy: for Thou wilt render unto every man
according to his works’ (CD, 5, 9, p. 201)
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol32/iss1/3

Augustine Contra Cicero

57

The order of the cosmos is not, therefore, the anonymous order to
be feared but rather the spoken Word of the Creator who both gives
power and exercises mercy.13 This leads to the next point. Because
the cosmos is the work of a personal creator, creaturely freedom
cannot be the freedom from that created order. Once this is
understood it will be easier to appreciate what may be, at least for us
modern Stoics, Augustine’s most difficult claim: that our wills are
contained within the order of causes which is the will of God (CD, 5,
9, pp. 201-202). His claim is that our will, which is our power to
influence the order of causes, is empowered by the will of God which
is the efficient cause of all things (CD, 5, 9, p. 202). In order to
understand this claim, it is necessary to note that Augustine does not
understand the will as a faculty, which would place the focus back on
dividing up the human agent into discernible acting “parts.” Rather,
the will is the concrete form of one’s passion-inspired existence when
that existence is expressed through agency. It gains its power by
being in harmony with the empowering Breath of the Creator who
“quickens all things” (CD, 5, 9, p. 202). Our free will, then, is our will
that has been empowered to act in common with the true source of
power. It is along these lines that we can understand the “destitute
power” that characterizes the “impious and proud” false gods who are
“deprived of [God’s] immutable light in which all may share” (CD,
11, 1, p. 449). Their destitute power is the result of their bondage to
themselves which is a result of their refusal to “take delight … in
submitting themselves” to the source, means and goodness of the
created order. By constructing his argument in keeping with these
false gods, Cicero posited an understanding of the cosmos and human
agency within that cosmos that prevented him from seeing human
agency in any terms other than those developed within Stoic and
Platonic ethics. Augustine’s rejection of Cicero’s argument is,
therefore, a rejection of the evaluation upon which Cicero
constructed his argument. This rejection is based solidly upon
Augustine’s own theology of creation in which participation in God
is not only the source for true knowledge but also the source of true
human freedom and power.

Conclusion: Confession and Affirmation
In contrast to Cicero, Augustine’s affirmation of free will and divine
foreknowledge is an affirmation of the relation between human
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agency and the created order. Augustine’s critique of Cicero, and
the Stoic assumptions upon which Cicero based his argument, is
not, therefore, merely a critique of one argument in isolation.
Rather, it is a critique of an entire evaluation of reality. By this I
mean that both Augustine and Cicero had the same given reality
with which to work: they both lived and acted in the midst of an
order of causes that seemed at once malleable and
incomprehensible. Augustine’s evaluation of this reality, based as it
was on the Scriptural witness to a Creator whose very presence is
discernible within the good created order, is grounded on an
affirmation that the creature’s own proper existence is to be turned
toward the source of that created order and, therefore, that human
agency is best understood in terms of participation in God through
the very affirmation of the world as creation, that is, as the Creator’s
gift to all. Only through such an affirmation can one avoid the
reactive posture of Stoic and Platonic ethics whose own evaluation
of the world in terms of an antagonism between the soul and the
body disallows them from understanding human agency and,
ultimately, happiness itself, in any terms other than the
phenomenologically incoherent terms of self-mastery.
I will now suggest that it is this affirmation of the world as God’s
good created order that lies at the basis of Augustine’s language of
confession, faith and belief in Bk. 5. In response to Cicero’s rejection
of divine foreknowledge in order to save free will, Augustine states
that the “religious mind … chooses both, confesses both, and
confirms both by the faith of godliness” (CD, 5, 9, p. 200).
Augustine’s language of confession and faith points to the centrality
of affirmation as the fundamental connecting point between
knowledge and ethics. This is so because, as we have seen, our
affirmative way of being in the world is, itself, the emergence of our
particular form of passion-inspired existence and, as such, it is the
very basis of our knowledge and our desire. In the midst of his
response to Cicero, Augustine suggests that “he lives ill who does not
believe well concerning God” (CD, 5, 10, p. 205). While it would be
easy to disregard or simply miss this remark, I believe that that would
be to miss out on a great deal of what is happening in Augustine’s
interaction with Cicero and the Stoic and Platonic philosophers.
Indeed, this remark seems to summarize the argument that I have
been advancing within this paper. One’s way of being in the world is
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fundamentally determined by the evaluation of reality on which it is
grounded. For Augustine, belief in God is fundamentally
determinative of one’s interpretation of everything else because it is
an evaluation of reality that provides the conditions for all other
valuations.14 If one takes Augustine’s language of confession
seriously, to confess something is explicitly to locate the matter of
that confession within the context of one’s evaluation of reality. Or,
to put the same thing in another way, it was Augustine’s language of
confession within his account of Cicero that led me to wonder if there
was not something more going on in that discussion than simply an
“intellectual” debate. By confessing the simultaneous affirmation of
free will and divine foreknowledge, Augustine locates that particular
affirmation within an affirmation of reality itself and it is this
affirmation of reality that Augustine will call faith.
I will conclude with a note about the view of freedom that
emerges from Augustine’s encounter with Cicero and the Stoic and
Platonic philosophers and its relation to the contemporary discussion
of free will within Augustine’s work. As I have shown, the reactive
posture of self-mastery assumes a view of freedom in which the
human agent is necessarily opposed to the order of causes within
which he operates. Freedom, therefore, is the human agent’s
freedom from that order.15 Augustine’s rejection of the evaluation
that made this notion of freedom possible is the basis for his
rejection of that notion of freedom. If what I have argued is an
accurate account of Augustine’s approach to the question of free will
within The City of God, it is safe to suggest that those who wish to
understand Augustine’s notion of free will must take these
considerations into account. At the very least it seems necessary to
ask what Augustine means by “freedom” before launching into an
account of his views of free will. The critical potential of asking
oneself this question comes when one realizes that many accounts of
free will within Augustine’s work proceed as though Augustine
actually held the understanding of freedom that he attributed to the
Stoic and Platonic philosophers. For example, Eleonore Stump’s
essay on Augustine and free will16 in the Cambridge Companion to
Augustine not only fails to specify what freedom actually means for
Augustine, but, more importantly, she also proceeds as though
Augustine’s understanding of freedom is freedom from external
causes. I will point to two examples within the essay that are
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particularly revealing. First, Stump assumes the arguments of
“compatibilism” and “libertarianism” in order to set the terms for her
discussion of Augustine’s treatment of freedom of the will. The
problem with this, however, is that both of these philosophical
positions assume a de facto opposition between human freedom and
an order of causes. Compatibilism “supposes that the world can be
causally determined and yet also contain free acts”17 while
libertarianism assumes that “an agent acts with free will… only if
the act is not casually determined by anything outside the agent.”18
According to my argument, Augustine would reject both of these
positions on the same grounds upon which he rejected Cicero’s
position because these positions assume that freedom is freedom
from an order of causes. Secondly, Stump’s conclusion is that
Augustine’s arguments do not suffice and, therefore, he runs the risk
of endorsing a deterministic position.19 The critique of determinism,
which was Cicero’s critique as well, is only sensible if one assumes
that freedom is necessarily defined over against the order of causes.
I have shown, however, that Augustine refuses this move precisely
because of the metaphysics and anthropology that it assumes.
In light of Stump’s approach, and the many others like it, I
suggest that Augustine’s thought is too radically theological to accept
the terms that have been defined above as Stoic and Platonic.
Therefore, however one wants to address the complexities of
Augustine’s view of the will, it is important to keep in mind his
radical claims about the place of this account within a theology of
creation and a phenomenology of the self. Only by doing this will one
be saved from turning Augustine into Cicero and relegating all
important discussions about freedom, the will and ethics to the
reactive logic of self-mastery.
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